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ATM; electronic signature (PIN); proof for civil
proceedings
Judgment
1. In this case Mr Job claims from Halifax PLC £2100
plus interest which he says the bank has wrongfully
debited from his current account with them. The
bank admit the debits, but say that they were
justified because that money was withdrawn from
the Claimant’s account with them by use, at ATM’s,
of his card and the correct PIN.
2. History. The Claimant came from Cameroon to this
country in 2000. His family, 2 daughters and his
wife, came in about the same year. He has claimed
asylum, but his application has not yet been finally
determined, though he has temporary leave to
remain and is not allowed to work. In September
2000 the Claimant opened a current account with
the bank. The nature of the card issued for use with
the account changed, but at the material time, in
February and March 2006, it was a Visa Electron
card which could be used, subject to there being
sufficient funds in the account, for online point of
sale transactions and for withdrawals at ATM’s. The
account was frequently used by the Claimant.
Although he did not have income from earnings, he
received support in particular from his cousin, who
is a professional footballer. On 15 December 2005
the account was replenished by payment in of
£10,000, which the Claimant says came from his
cousin, and it remained healthily in credit until the
events with which this case is concerned.
3. On 21 February 2006 the account had a credit
balance of £3,565.59. There then followed, over an
8 day period, 8 debits reflecting, on the bank’s case,
use of the card. The withdrawals took place at 2
ATM’s: HSBC Whitley Street, Reading, and Natwest
103, Basingstoke Road, Reading. Both ATM’s are
close to the address at which the Claimant was then
residing, and both had been used by the Claimant in
the recent past:
(i) Wed 22 February 2006 1331 £300 HSBC
(ii) Thur 23 February 2006 2127 £200 HSBC
(iii) Thur 23 February 2006 2127 £100 HSBC
(iv) Fri 24 February 2006 0026 £300 Natwest
(v) Sun 26 February 2006 0936 £300 HSBC
(vi) Mon 27 February 2006 1916 £300 HSBC
(vii) Tue 28 February 2006 2112 £300 Natwest
(viii) Wed 1 March 2006 2250 £300 HSBC
4. The Claimant’s account of matters and subsequent
events The Claimant says that the card was in his
possession at all times, including during the period
of the disputed transactions. He never told anyone
else about his bank details, including the PIN
number: neither his wife and 2 daughters nor
anyone else. He has not authorised anyone else to
withdraw money or given them the means of doing
so. On the occasions of the withdrawals on 23 and
28 February he was coaching, or had just finished
coaching, a football team. On 26 February he was
on his way to or at a junior team football match. On
24 February he was at home. On 1 March he was at
home watching television On that day in the
evening he was at Morrisons waiting for his
daughter to do her shopping. He decided to check
the balance on his account at the ATM there. He did,
and noticed “some irregular withdrawals from my
account that I did not recognise”. At the hearing the
question was not resolved whether he had the
ability at the ATM to call up a mini statement or only
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the balance. At all events, he says he became aware
that there was much less in his account than there
should be. He did not ring the bank that night,
believing that the office would be closed, but went
home and watched television. Before he went to
bed he took the card from his wallet and hid it
under a griddle drum in the garden, retrieving it the
next morning. The last questioned withdrawal took
place after he had discovered the state of his bank
account and while he was at home watching
television, with his family in the house.
5. The next morning the Claimant went to the bank. He
pointed out the withdrawals and was advised to
inform the police. In the succeeding days he was
sent another card. As the bank were prepared to
accept, he did not receive it, and withdrawals made
using it were refunded. On 10 April he was in the
branch pursuing his complaint. He said he would
not leave until he was re-imbursed. The police were
called to see him off the premises. Halifax then
closed the account. Re-imbursement was later
refused, and the Claimant’s complaint to the
financial services ombudsman was unsuccessful.
He begun this claim on 20 March 2007. The
Claimant himself gave evidence in support of his
account. There were statements from each of his
daughters, who are now at university. The
Claimant’s wife, who was the other family member
generally present at the material time, sadly died in
2008.
6. The Defence sets out the Defendants’ case: that the
Claimants card and the correct PIN were used for
these withdrawals, and that (in its essentials) the
transactions were either carried out by him, or
authorised by him, or resulted from his gross
negligence in enabling someone else to have
possession of the card or PIN. Since it is the
Claimant’s case that he was in possession of the
card at all times and had never divulged or
compromised the security of the PIN, then if the
bank proves that these transactions were made and
that system error or third party fraud unconnected
with the Claimant can be ruled out on the balance
of probabilities, it is accepted the Claimant’s case
would fail.
7. The factual evidence for the bank consists of a
printout of data resulting from interrogation of the
computer system, which evidence these
transactions. The printouts are not readily
intelligible to the layman, and for their
interpretation and other technical explanations the
Defendants relied on the evidence of Ian Brown,
Senior Consultant, Cryptographic services, HBOS
group IT. There was also independent expert
evidence: For the Claimant from Dr Steven Murdoch,
a researcher in the security group at Cambridge
University, and a fellow of Christ’s college; and for
the Defendants from Mr David Baker the head of
APACS Cards technical unit, with responsibility for
providing technical and operational oversight of the
UK card payments infrastructure. APACS is a trade
association of UK member banks.
8. The Claimant’s card was a chip and PIN card. The
Defendants’ case is that, as used in these
transactions, the CHIP on the card was used to
interact with the bank’s systems and so authorise
the payments. The chip holds information, but it
also contains a CPU, and so is also a computer. The
card and the chip go after manufacture to a
personalisation bureau. The chip is
cryptographically unlocked and programmed as a
Visa Electron chip. It is then locked again. Later the
personalisation file is sent from HBOS to the
personalisation bureau, doubly encrypted.
Personalisation takes place during a production run
using a combination of secret keys. The PIN is not
processed by the card, but has to be used with it in
order for a transaction to be authorised. When the
card is used, the encrypted PIN is transmitted to
and verified by HBOS systems.
9. Apart from the PIN, an ATM transaction involves
what in laymens’ terms could be described as a
conversation between the chip on the card and the
HBOS systems. They include cryptographic checks.
During this process the chip, on request from the
ATM, will produce an Application Request
Cryptogram (ARQC). The ARQC will be generated
using cryptographic keys on the card. In response
HBOS systems will transmit an authorisation
response Cryptogram (ARPC) which includes a
decision on the request. That in turn has to be
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validated by the chip, which then generates a
transaction certificate cryptogram (TC) to complete
the transaction. Although third parties are involved
in the transmission of data, namely the ATM owner
and the Link transmission system, the data is
encrypted.
10. The card, on a magnetic strip, also contains
identification and other data which enable the card
to be used for non-chip transactions. The use of the
magnetic strip is substantially less secure than the
use of the chip technology. In February 2006 it was
still possible for a card with a chip to be used in a
non chip, or backup, transaction at an ATM, where
the data on the magnetic strip was used to achieve
the transaction. By later in that year a change was
made that now results in transactions being
declined if a chip card attempts at an ATM with a
non chip transaction. However, I am satisfied on the
evidence of Mr Brown that the transactions with
which this case is concerned were transactions
recorded by the system as having been processed
by chip. He explained that had the backup strip
information been used, and not the chip, the
printout of the transaction would have had different
features. Thus in this case we are dealing with
transactions recorded by the system as having been
carried out by the chip process briefly described
above.
11. Mr Brown relies on the transaction log, as explained
by him, to prove that these transactions took place.
More detailed information containing
authentication data, including the ARQC, was
retained for 180 days but is not now available. The
logs available show standard transaction
processing. The process of validation, steps in
which can be traced, either results in an approved
transaction or it doesn’t. The card unique key is not
held anywhere on the system and HBOS does not
have a method of generating it. Mr Brown has seen,
but has not produced, a record from the LINK
system showing that transmission of data for these
transactions took place. The bank relies on the
assertion that even now, in 2009, there is no
evidence that fraudulent chip and PIN cards can be
produced, and that a systems fault that allowed
withdrawals without the appropriate chip or PIN, or
which showed transactions which had not taken
place, would have resulted in widespread problems.
The absolute out come of a complex and encrypted
process is relied upon.
12. It is convenient to deal with the Claimant’s position
by listing the ways in which Dr Murdoch
contemplated the system could have reached the
result of showing these transactions even though
neither Mr Job nor anyone connected with him had
used his card and PIN. It is agreed that the cloning
of Mr Job’s card through “an invasive physical
attack” is unlikely. There is currently no evidence
that criminals are able to clone chip cards. Apart
from such cloning, Dr Murdoch’s list in his report is:
(i) An error being made during design or
personalisation of a card which makes it
possible to extract the card unique key.
(ii) An error during the personalisation process
which results in multiple copies of the same
card being created.
(iii)An error of the authorisation or reporting
process which causes it to report that a
transaction has been successfully chip verified,
when it has not been.
(iv)A compromise of the personalisation process
which allows a malicious person to know the
card unique key or create cards with the card
unique key.
(v) A compromise of the authorisation server which
allows a malicious person to carry out a
transaction, despite the chip verification having
failed.
13. Dr Murdoch said that he had recently been
contacted by someone who had been sent 2 cards
in the post several days apart, and he had tested
them and found them identical. Some details of that
event, including the bank’s ultimate response at the
end of the story, remained obscure. There was no
evidence of the extent to which other possibilities
listed had come about. Mr Baker said that if the
transaction was cryptographically authorised then
either the genuine card was used, or a “high tech”
attack had been used to defeat the security checks.
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As to the latter, APACS are not aware of high tech
attacks having taken place with ATM transactions
like these. Mr Baker said in writing:
To my knowledge there have been no incidents of
physical, procedural, personnel or logical controls
being breached on any bank system that would
lead to the successful attack to compromise the
cryptographic keys. If these controls were to have
been breached then we would expect to see a
large number of cards compromised rather than
just Mr Job’s. Since the beginning of the chip and
PIN programme over 300 million chip and PIN
cards have been issued securely and we have no
evidence of such a breach.
Mr Baker repeated in evidence that he knew of no
reported instances of chip and PIN breaches with
ATM’s. Such events would not be kept secret. APACS
would have to divulge such developments.
14. Dr Murdoch accepted that, though there were no
public statistics on how often incidents occur that
allow transactions to be recorded that are not
authorised by the correct chip and PIN, it seemed
likely that such cases were a small proportion of
card transactions overall, so that it would be quite
unlikely that any individual cardholder, selected at
random, would be in this situation. He said in
writing:
This fact is not relevant in the case at hand, since
both sides agree that Mr Job is disputing a charge
which bank records indicate being a chip
transaction. What is at question is whether it is
more likely that the card issued to Mr Job was
used to carry out the disputed transaction, or
whether the transaction was carried out by a
criminal without the authorisation of Mr Job. This
depends on the evidence of the disputed
transaction, and the likelihood of different
explanations for the evidence, not the fact that
such situations occur rarely.
In his oral evidence Dr Murdoch seemed to attach
importance to, or at least to identify this case as
unusual because of, the fact that Mr Job has
pressed the matter as far as litigation. It did seem
to me that a comparison of the likelihood of Mr
Job’s card and PIN being used (on the one hand)
and any of the other possible explanations put
forward (on the other) was being avoided.
15. It seemed to me that at the centre of the debate
was the question whether the bank had produced
enough information to prove their case. Have they
disclosed enough to enable the history of the
transaction and its integrity to be demonstrated.
The ARQC, if it had still been available, would have
shown that a chip transaction had been attempted.
The unique number for the card would enable one
to know that the correct card had responded. As to
the unique number, it was Mr Brown’s evidence,
supported by Mr Baker, that the number is nowhere
stored. It could be generated by the development of
particular software, but the system is such that it
cannot be produced. It is identified for the purposes
of an individual transaction by the use of master
keys of the bank’s system, but a record of it is not
made. I did not understand HBOS to be different
from other banks in this respect of the non
availability of cryptographic keys. Absolute reliance
is placed on the proposition that if a chip
transaction takes place the right keys have been
used in the exchange between the chip and the
bank’s system.
16. For the Claimant, Mr Mason submits that it is for the
bank to prove how the transactions actually
occurred, for example to produce the ARQC’s and
the PIN, sufficient for the court to draw its own
conclusions. He submits that the logs produced are
not sufficient. It may be treated as part of the
business records of the bank, but the process by
which the printout is arrived at is obscure. The
ARQC’s would show that these were chip
transactions. Those, and other original transaction
data, appear to have been destroyed under the
bank’s policy, though they were initially available. It
is said that it is for the bank to show that the card
did not have any flaws that would enable the key to
be extracted from it; that a strong random number
generator was used; that there were appropriate
controls on key management; and that there were
appropriate controls on the personalisation
process. The only evidence is identified as being Mr
Baker’s assertion that there has never been a key
compromise in the industry. The assertion is only a
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statement of the bank’s ignorance. Although card
fraud generally is prevalent, the bank has produced
no evidence of the nature and number of frauds that
affect chip and PIN cards. The case being made by
the Defendants that these transactions did not have
the common indications of fraud does not carry
weight unless the common indications are
identified. Moreover, transactions involving
withdrawal of the maximum amount allowed on a
daily basis for a week are not typical of the way in
which Mr Job runs his account.
17. For the Defendants Mr Kramer submits that use of
Mr Job’s card with the correct PIN is by far the most
likely explanation for these events. After physical
cloning of the card is ruled out, a system failure or a
super hacker would involve a profound compromise
of the bank’s systems. Such an event would have
come to light in other ways, and would not just
reveal itself by a series of withdrawals from Mr Job’s
bank account. The examples that the Claimant has
raised during the course of the case, such as “yes”
card cloning were not apposite to online chip and
PIN transactions, nor were the cases referred to, for
instance the Citibank criminal case in the United
States, where a widespread fraud was perpetrated
by hacking into retailers’ systems to obtain card
numbers and account information. Here the use of
the correct PIN, which cannot be found on the card
itself, and is transmitted in encrypted form, is to be
considered in addition to the integrity of the chip.1
All the explanations put forward are highly unlikely,
compared with the probability of Mr Job’s card being
used.
18. Mr Kramer also makes submissions about the
surrounding and attending circumstances:
(i) If this was a fraud, the criminals would not have
chosen a basic Electron card account, which
cannot go into overdraft.
(ii) Having the use of the card, a fraudster would
not have confined himself to ATM transactions
with a maximum of £300 per day, and without
knowing the probably modest amount in the
account, rather than trying point of sale
transactions.
(iii) The last attempted use of the card was the day
before the matter was reported to the bank,
and there were no attempts to use it thereafter,
so if this was a fraud the perpetrator
coincidentally stopped before the bank was
alerted.
(iv) The 2 ATM’s concerned were close to the
Claimant’s house and ones which he used
regularly.
(v) The Claimant is in fact careless with his cards.
In the few years he had an account he seems to
have lost 7 cards. In addition 2 cards were sent
to him, including a credit card, that he says he
did not receive.
(vii) Mr Job had already in 2005 obtained a refund
after reporting non receipt of a credit card and
PIN.
(viii)No withdrawals other than the disputed ones
were made during the period in question.
19. Although the expression “test case” is not applied
to this claim by either side, it has provoked wider
interest. It is clear that there is an uneasy
relationship between the financial institutions and
those involved externally in the security world,
including the academic world. I was shown a blog or
part of a blog headed “Chip and PIN on trial” which
was written by specific reference to this case, and to
which several people had contributed. There is a
hint of small men whose cases have merit against
the juggernaut corporation which will admit no
wrong. It is also said to be the experience of
customers who complain of fraud or a failure of
1 Note from the editor: Professor Ross Anderson has
indicated that this is not correct. The PIN is actually
stored on the card in clear, and it is transmitted in
clear from the terminal to the card in merchant
terminal transactions. In ATM transactions, the
traditional way of dealing with PINs has been to
encrypt them at the ATM and send them to the
issuing bank for verification. Both of these are
vulnerable to interception. In the case of a
merchant terminal, it is possible to obtain the card
details and PIN directly. In the case of an ATM, the
attacker can switch a negative authorisation into a
positive one, because the authorisation responses
are generally not encrypted. The learned judge
requested both counsel in the case to comment on
his judgment before it was made public, but
because I do not have a sufficiently detailed
knowledge of the technical issues, regrettably I
failed to alert the learned judge to this point.
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technology that they inevitably face a denial of
liability and are unsuccessful with the ombudsman,
as Mr Job has been. I mention those matters merely
to emphasise that this is certainly not a test case,
and has no wider forensic importance. It happens to
be a case where the complainant has pursued the
claim to litigation and trial, but, unlike Dr Murdoch,
I do not attach any measure of evidential
significance to that.
20. I do not accept the Claimant’s proposition that each
step in the process has to be expressly
demonstrated. I do think that the absence of a
history of successful fraudulent attacks on online
chip and PIN transactions, and the absence of any
evidence of systems failure, as showing that these
were transactions that can be taken at face value,
(both of which are supported by the evidence of Mr
Baker and Mr Brown), are important pieces of
evidence from which it is open to the court to draw
the inference that these were transactions that took
place using Mr Job’s card and his PIN. That is a
conclusion that I do reach in this case. The
surrounding circumstances are a significant help in
that, in particular that the withdrawals are all
recorded as made at ATM’s which the Claimant
himself used near his home; that they stopped
without the card being captured or rejected before
the matter was reported; and that the transactions
in question were all cash withdrawals and on one
single Electron account to the extent of just over
£2,000. Those circumstances in particular seem to
me to add weight to the bank’s case that this record
of transactions does not appear because of systems
failure or because of fraud. As was accepted a
finding such as I have made means that the
Claimant is not successful in the case, because his
case that he had the card at all times and had never
compromised the PIN must be rejected. I do not find
quite how these withdrawals came to be made, only
that they were made by him, or by someone
authorised by him, or by gross negligence in that he
had enabled someone else to use the card and have
the means of knowledge of the PIN.
21. Although I have found the evidence, including that
of the surrounding circumstances, enables the bank
to prove their case, I do repeat that the decision has
no wider significance. It is a decision of one Judge in
the county court on the evidence that he has heard
and considered. I do add this warning, however: In
other circumstances and without surrounding
evidence another court might give weight to 2
matters in particular. Firstly, the bank had and
retained more detailed information from which the
course of the transactions could be traced, but
destroyed it after 180 days (in this case even after a
dispute had arisen). I do not expect that the
argument that the bank should develop the means
to produce the card unique key, and should also
produce it, will ever gain much purchase, but in
other cases the failure to preserve evidence in its
complete initial form may be held against a bank.
Secondly, I do accept the caution of Mr Mason,
echoing Professor Tapper, against the assumption
that a computer system is necessarily working
properly. The absence of relevant operational
problems at the material time, and statistical
evidence more carefully marshalled and
demonstrated than by the witnesses here, could be
a helpful and in some cases a necessary component
of a bank’s case.
22. In this case, however, I find that the bank has
proved its case about these transactions on the
balance of probabilities, and the claim must be
dismissed.
The Order:-
IT IS ORDERED BY CONSENT that
1. The Claimants’ claim be dismissed and judgment be
entered for the Defendant.
2. The Defendant’s costs of this action be paid by the
Claimant within 14 days of the date of this
Judgment, as follows:
2.1 Fast track trial costs of £485 plus £345 under
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CPR Part 46; and
2.2 Pre-trial costs and post-trial costs summarily
assessed at £15,000.2
© His Honour Judge Inglis, 20093
Commentary 
The case of Job v Halifax plc was an interesting and
significant case in respect of ATM withdrawals and the
effect of Chip and PIN (personal identification number)
technology.
Although the judge expressly stated that the case is
not to be considered as a precedent, the case was
carefully argued before him with respected expert
witnesses and the judge gave a thorough and
considered judgement. Consequently the case suggests
the approach that courts in England & Wales will take in
similar cases – which again will be decided on the
particular facts.
Alain Job sued Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) in
March 2007 over eight withdrawals made from his
account in February 2006. Job maintained that he did
not withdraw a cumulative £2,100. He also maintained
he did not authorize anyone else to withdraw the
money. Mr Job decided to initiate legal action after the
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS), which mediates
disputes between banks and customers, sided with
HBOS.
Alain Job was an asylum seeker from Cameroon. He
entered the UK in 2000, and was given the right to stay
but was not permitted to work. He coped financially
through the help of friends, charities and family. But
owing to the UK immigration policy, he led a fairly
chaotic life and had to move from one home to another.
Following the dispersal policy initiated by the Home
Office, he was moved to Nottingham where he received
some 350 hate mails that forced him to move back to
Reading. His wife died in August 2008.
Mr Job was represented pro bono by Stephen Mason,
a barrister who wrote and edited the well regarded
practitioners book on digital evidence Electronic
Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility
(LexisNexis, 2007).
Prior to the hearing of the case, the author had a
meeting with Stephen in which the author set out some
of the history of ATM litigation in the UK, and thereafter
with his agreement prepared a 17 page Witness
Statement and 36 page Exhibit for use in the case if
certain matters were not admitted by HBOS (see below)
and attended the trial in case the author was needed to
be called to give evidence. As matters turned out, the
points the author addressed were not in issue in this
case, and consequently the author’s witness statement
and exhibit were not used by Mr Mason and did not
form part of the material placed before the court.
Stephen explained that had they been used, because
the specific facts were finally not in issue in this case, he
might have been liable for costs.
Alain Job was the first person to sue a UK bank over a
phantom withdrawal since Chip and PIN has been
deployed. The bank relied on the purported electronic
signature of Mr Job, and it was argued by Mr Mason that
the burden of proof was on the bank to prove that it
acted in accordance with the mandate, in that:
a.Cash in respect of each of the transactions was
physically withdrawn from the ATMs.
b.Mr Job’s card was used in each transaction.
c. Mr Job or a person authorised by him concluded the
transactions, or that his carelessness enabled an
unauthorised person to do so. Even if the correct
PIN was entered into the ATM, it does not follow
that Mr Job or a person authorised by Mr Job
entered the PIN. A perfect forgery is nonetheless a
forgery. The bank requires a PIN to be used, even
though the use of a PIN acts to prevent the bank
distinguishing a forged signature from a perfect
signature.
One material possibility, raised by Stephen Mason, was
that his card had been cloned. HBOS maintained that it
was his exact card that was used to perform the
withdrawals and consequently that either Mr Job
knowingly tried to defraud the bank, or was grossly
negligent in handling his card and PIN.
2 The amount submitted by Halifax PLC at trial for
costs up to but excluding trial exceeded £36,000.
3 Whether a judicial judgment is the copyright of the
Crown or the individual Judge in England & Wales
is not clear. In responding to the Gowers Review of
Intellectual Property (HMSO, November 2006),
Philip Leith, Professor of Law at Queen’s University
of Belfast submitted a short paper Copyright in the
Digital Age: court judgments, in which he briefly
illustrated the position of copyright of judgments
in Ireland and the UK (considered to be
unsatisfactory), and suggested that both countries
should harmonise the position in relation to the
practice in the USA and the EU, available at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/queens_
university_of_belfast_237_kb.pdf. In the interests
of clarity, Pario Communications Limited does not
claim ownership of copyright in this judgment. His
Honour Judge Inglis granted permission for the
judgment to be published in the Review through
Susannah Nightingale, District Judges Listing
Officer at Nottingham County Court, in an
exchange of e-mails with the editor on 1 June 2009.
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HBOS, though their counsel, suggested that Mr Job
had been careless with his cards noting the fact that he
had been through nine cards in six years and, having
discovered the disputed transactions on his last card,
had not reported the matter by telephone the same
night but had waited until the following morning. Mr
Job, in evidence, retorted that he thought the card fraud
centre closed at 10.00 pm and did not realise that it was
a twenty-four hour service. During the course of his
evidence, Mr Job admitted in respect of previous ATM
cards that he had twice claimed that he had never
received the card or the PIN and that consequently
HBOS had reimbursed him for withdrawals on these
cards because the bank could not prove that Mr Job had
received the cards and PIN. He also admitted, at one
point during testimony, to putting his ATM card at night
under a kettle barbecue griddle drum in his garden for
some inexplicable reason. Although it was not
commented on by anyone at the trial, the only inference
that could reasonably be drawn from this action was
that Mr Job was concerned that someone in his house
knew his PIN and could therefore have been making
unauthorised withdrawals on his account. He also said
in evidence, that having discovered the disputed
transactions on his last card (nearly £3,000) when
checking his balance at a shopping centre, he had not
mentioned this loss to his daughters who were with him
at the time – wanting, allegedly, instead to check the
facts before raising the matter. This evidence, coupled
with the kettle barbecue griddle drum evidence, gave
rise to an implication that Mr Job did not trust the
people around him and believed that his PIN may have
been known by others.
The judge concluded that Halifax had discharged its
burden and proved that Mr Job’s card was used in the
ATMs. He did not reach any conclusion as to how the
withdrawals were made, only that they were made by
Mr Job, or by someone authorized by him, or by gross
negligence. In addition, the judge rejected the argument
put forward by Mr Mason that the bank should prove
each step in the process (cash withdrawn from the ATM
and evidence of the ARQC).
ATMs prior to Chip and PIN – the legal position
before 2006
In 1992-3, the author was counsel in a Group Action
against all the UK banks and building societies
representing around 2,000 plaintiffs and potential
plaintiffs. At that time, ATM cards had no security
features such as Chip and PIN but were simply magnetic
stripe cards. Indeed, one bank issued the same PIN to
all its customers.4 In May 1993 in a preliminary point of
law, the author managed to get the banks to make the
following formal admission: A bank is not entitled to
debit its customer’s account unless it has the
customer’s mandate to do so. The normal rules of
evidence apply and the burden of proof is on the bank
to prove that all withdrawals had been made in
accordance with the customer’s mandate.
A mere entry on a bank’s computer system indicating
that cash had been withdrawn by use of an ATM card
and a PIN does not prove that a withdrawal had been
made in accordance with the customer’s mandate. There
must be evidence showing that the customer in person
entered the PIN. This remains the law. In April 2009 in
the Job case, HBOS effectively admitted that the above
position was still the law. However, today the technical
issues that arise from Chip and PIN have complicated
the matter.
The technical issues in Job v Halifax 
As can be seen from the judgment, His Honour Judge
Inglis accepted printouts from log files to show that Mr
Job’s card had been used for the transactions, even
though the log files are secondary evidence and do not
necessarily prove that Mr Job’s card had not been
cloned. The log files comprised of information that was
sent by the ATM about a transaction to the bank’s record
system. Inexplicably, two primary pieces of evidence
once held by Halifax were destroyed, including Mr Job’s
ATM card and the ARQC (Authorization Request
Cryptogram), a piece of information generated from the
encryption keys on the card that interacts with the
bank’s back-end systems. The ARQC would have shown
whether the machine has read the card’s chip. The lack
of an ARQC record raised the possibility that it never
existed in the first place, and that a cloned card was
used or just a cloned card with a magnetic stripe. HBOS
failed to present other primary evidence, namely the
records from the ATM used in the transactions, and by
the time that Stephen Mason became involved in the
case, it was too late to require the production of this
information by HBOS.
Of great interest was the fact that UK ATMs can be
made to default to read the magnetic stripe if the chip is
defective, thereby allowing a transaction to go through.
Because HBOS was relying upon secondary evidence, it
was not completely clear whether the ATM in question
4 Ross J Anderson, Security Engineering, (2nd
edition, Wiley, 2008), 340.
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had defaulted in this manner – there was a clear lack of
forensic computing evidence that could have
established the fact conclusively. In the printout, the
witness from HBOS asserted that the highlighted ‘04’
bytes meant that the transaction had been validated
against a Chip. But the defence experts who were not
given access to the systems that generated the ‘04’
bytes could not check this statement. Nor were the
defence experts given anything other than a description
of the validation system in the vaguest of terms.
None of the technical evidence presented suggested
that criminals currently can clone a microchip for a Chip
and PIN card, although security researchers have done
this.
What was of specific interest is that it was admitted
that Chip and PIN frauds are taking place because cards
are being cloned without the chip and then used in
countries where their ATM cards have not yet
implemented the Chip and PIN technology. The judge
mentioned in the course of the hearing that he too had
had his ATM card cloned and used ‘to buy pizzas in
Essex’, adding that he had not been to Essex in
decades.
Conclusions
This judgement by a thoughtful judge bears careful
scrutiny. A small ray of sunlight has been shone on the
inner workings of banking security practices, and many
lawyers now know what to look for. One important
difficulty for anyone wishing to litigate against a UK
bank has been the risk of the bank seeking costs
against them – and pursuing the matter by asking for an
order for attachment of earnings and charges on homes.
Mr Alain Job was therefore, in some respects, the ideal
claimant: someone who had no assets, lived in rented
accommodation and by law was not allowed to take
paid employment. In making his order, the judge
ordered that Mr Job pay £15,000 towards HBOS costs,
but this order will never be satisfied because there are
no assets which could be attached.
A prudent banker should look at this judgement and
make some changes to domestic banking procedures.
All primary digital evidence, such as the ARCQ, needs to
be systematically retained in archival form so that it
could be produced if required. All ATMs should have
their daily records archived for a similar reason. And
there is no good reason why a pinhole digital camera
should not be built into all ATMs with the photographs
stored with the records – storage costs today are
minimal, any data protection and privacy issue is false,
because the photograph could only be used in
preventing or prosecuting crime.
Following the case, Stephen Mason has put some very
relevant and useful notes on his website
(http://www.stephenmason.eu), setting out the issues
and making practical suggestions on what to do if you
believe that you have suffered an ATM fraud. In
addition, the author has also prepared a ‘Preservation
Letter’ that requires the bank to preserve all the
evidence. The aim of this letter is to act as a mechanism
to put the card issuer on notice of the dispute, and
setting out what evidence should be retained by the
card issuer. This letter is published below (and is
available as a free download from the author’s web
site).
‘Preservation Letter’
[your address]
[their address]
[date]
Request for preservation of evidence in respect of ATM
transactions
Dear Sir or Madam,
ACCOUNT NUMBER: xxxxxxxxx
As you are aware I am currently in dispute with you in
respect of certain ATM transactions on my account,
which I write to confirm that I did not make or authorize.
There transactions are:
[date] [Description from Bank Statement] [£Amount]
[date] [Description from Bank Statement] [£Amount]
[date] [Description from Bank Statement] [£Amount]
Under the law, when matters of this kind are in dispute,
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the burden of proof is upon you to establish on a
balance of probabilities that I have made or authorized
the transactions listed above once I have told you that I
have not made or authorized them. In this regard I
respectfully direct you to Section 24 of the Bills of
Exchange Act 1882.
My request
Accordingly, pursuant to the Civil Practice Rules and
specifically the legal requirement that, upon notice
being served upon a party in respect of a dispute, there
is a duty to preserve all relevant evidence both in
support of and against the dispute, I require you to
preserve all relevant evidence in respect of your ATM
system and the disputed ATM transactions listed above,
pending the determination of our dispute.
This shall be done in the following manner:
1. In respect of the disputed ATM transactions, I
require you to preserve the complete chain of
transactional custody from the moment the alleged
transaction was communicated to you. This shall
include all transactional logs and error reports
including any and all communications between your
computers, computers belonging to or operated by
corresponding banks (or other financial
institutions), the ATM terminals alleged to have
been used in the disputed transactions, the
magnetic stripe on the ATM card and the Chip on
the ATM card. Without prejudice to the forgoing, this
data shall include all the ATM receipts and all the
ARCQ (Authorization Request Cryptogram)
information. It shall also include all metadata, error
logs, system reports, engineers’ reports,
maintenance schedules, software and software
updates in respect of the complete system so that it
is possible to establish the precise state of each
and every component involved in the disputed ATM
transaction. If you have CCTV images or other
independent evidence surrounding the disputed
transactions (e.g. serial numbers of bank notes in
the ATMs) this too shall be preserved. If you are
aware of CCTV images or other independent
evidence that may be retained by others in the
vicinity of the disputed transactions, then you
should seek to have this preserved as well.
2. In respect of all ATM transactions, I understand that
you will have reports from internal audit and from
security consultants on the security (or otherwise)
of your ATM network and its vulnerability to fraud
(both internal and external). While I am prepared to
admit that these are confidential documents, they
are not privileged documents and I require you to
undertake to preserve them and in due course, if
this matter proceeds to litigation (or adjudication by
the FOS), to list each and everyone of them,
together with the reports of actions taken to
counter the vulnerabilities raised by these reports.
[If the customer still has the card] I still have my
ATM card, which I am keeping in a safe place. I
understand that the ATM card is meant to contain
within it what is termed an Application Transaction
Counter (ATC). This ATC is incremented by one each
time a transaction is initiated. Should you so wish,
and at your expense, I am prepared to give my ATM
card to an independent digital evidence specialist to
enable him to establish whether the ATC has been
incremented in accordance with each and every
ATM transaction upon my bank statements or
whether there are any discrepancies. To enable this
to be done, you are to provide the independent
digital evidence specialist with full cooperation in
respect of his enquiries.
[If the customer no longer has the card because he
returned it to the bank] I returned my ATM card to
you on [Date] and I trust that you have kept in
securely. I understand that every ATM card is meant
to contain within it what is termed an Application
Transaction Counter (ATC). This ATC is incremented
by one each time a transaction is initiated. Should
you so wish, and at your expense, I am prepared to
give my ATM card to an independent digital
evidence specialist to enable him to establish
whether the ATC has been incremented in
accordance with each and every ATM transaction
upon my bank statements or whether there are any
discrepancies. To enable this to be done you are to
provide the independent digital evidence specialist
with full cooperation in respect of his enquiries.
Accordingly within 14 days of the date of this letter
you may either:
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1. Reimburse me with all the disputed ATM
transactions listed at the start of this letter; or
2. Confirm that you have preserved all the above
information pending the determination of this
dispute. If you have been unable to preserve any of
the above information, you must notify me of this
fact in your reply.
Yours faithfully,
© Alistair Kelman, 2009
Alistair is a barrister with engineering and computing
qualifications. Following 25 years at the intellectual property
bar he moved into industry as a legal technology consultant
and web developer. Today he works as a Digital Evidence
Specialist Witness and as a consultant to high tech businesses
and start-ups.
http://www.alikelman.com
ali.kelman@gmail.com
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